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Instrumentally Rational Myopic Planning 
Chrisnula Ilndrenu 
Abstract: I dtallenge the view tha(, in case-~ where time- for deliberation is HOL all issue, 
iusLrumenLal raLionality precludes myopic planning. 1 show where there is room fm 
insLl"UlllenLally raLional myopic planning, and the-n argue that such planning is }Jus~iule noL 
only iu Lheory iL is sUllleLhing human hein~s Gln ;md do engage in. l·he possiuilicy uf sudt 
vlanuiug has, huwever, heen di~regarded, and this disregard has skewed relaLeu ueuaLes 
com:eruiug- iusLrulllenLal raLionality. 
1. Introduction 
\Vhat are the require1nenrs of reason whcn it comes to making decisions 
and acting? One must, of course, be insttu1nentally rationa1. BUI what 
exactly does being inslnunental1y rational involve? And what, if any, 
requirements of practical reason are there 111 additioll to the 
requl1"e1nenls of instrumental rationality? Debate concerning this last 
(illestion has a long history in philosophy. Think, lor exa1np1c, of the 
ancient debate in Plalo's RejmM£r concerning ·whether the requirements 
of justice are requirements of practical reaSOl!. Debale concerning I he 
require1nents of insLIullKntal rationality is, hy contrast, a relatively 
recent development.. Induded among the I110st inlluential agitators arc 
David Gauthier and Edward NT cClennen. Roth Gauthier and :YlcCIennen 
nject. t.he tr;Hiit.ional assumption that instrumental rationality calls for 
straightforward I11axilnization in favor of the vie'iv that instlunlental 
rationality calls for some fOrIn of conslrained InaxiI11izaLion. 1 Unlike a 
slraigluforward lnaximizcr, a constrained maximizer \",i11 sOlnetinles stick 
to a prior intention even if she could do llclJcr (relative Lo her concerns) 
by abandoning the intention. Othelwise put, constrained lllaxiI11iLcrs 
exhibit a sort of resoluteness that straightfoHvanl InaxiInizers lack. 
I See, [or example, (Gauthier 1904) and (McClennen 1997). 
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Like Gauthier and :McClennen, I wan I. to spark debate cOTlcerning the 
nature of instrmTlcntal rationality. But my aim is not to jump in ,,,,Til.l! 
smne novel deknse of either straightfonvanl maximization or 
constrained maximization. Rather, my aim is to challenge a scctningly 
IHodest vic\v thaI. has yet to he the ol~ject of much suspicion, but that has, 
though it is rarely lnade explicit, contributed Lo shaping- or rather 
misshaping-current debate concerning instrumental rationali!y. The 
vie\v concerns luyo:pic planning, which involves forming a fuu1fe-
directed intention without thinking about "\",hat things will be like for onc 
VdlCl1 the tiUIC to carry out the intention arrives. According to the vie\v I 
aim to challenge, insttumental rationality precludes Inyopic planning, at 
leasl. in cases vdlCre time for deliberation is not an issue. (Note that this 
last clause will henceiorth be left implicit.) AfteT providing a limited 
defense of the coherence of the idea of myopic planning, I vllill argue 
that the possibility of a certain sort of instnuIlcnl.ally rational agent-a 
helief-economizing sort-threatens the vie\v that instrumental rationality 
predudes Inyopic planning. I will Ihen pul. fonvard a couple of examples 
that will, T hope, reveal beliel-econolllization as a very farniliar 
phenOInenon. The conclusion 1 \'vill draw is that ·in.stnunl"ntally mhonal 
myopic planning i .. possible, and not just in theory-it is smnething ';.ve 
human beings can and do (at least sometimcs) engage in. Ultimately, my 
aim is t.o improve our understanding of ourselves and of l.he 
requirements of practical reason. 
II. Instrumentally Rational Agents 
As I will understand the notion of an instrumentally ralional agent, 
insl.rurnenl.ally raLional agcnl.s arc rcflective. They have conscious goals 
and reason ,.,.Tell in their pursuit of these guals. Inslrumentally rational 
ag·enl.s need not, howcvcr, be highly self-reflective. Tn particular, one can 
be instrumentally rational withoul. havillg a conception of oneself as 
instrumentally rational in mind. I take it that to suppose otherwise would 
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III. Myopic Planning 
In myopic planning, onc plans ahead without really thinking ahead. In 
other words, one l(]nns an intention without forming judgments 
concerning the folloY\ing: (i) whether one's situation and motival.ions 
comhincd will he conducive to one's caITying out one's intention when 
the time lor action arrives; (ii) whether one's situation and motivations 
con1bined will favor one's carrying out one's intenl.ion whcn l.he tit11e for 
action arrives. A rnyopic planner is thus prone to fanning intentions that 
it is easy to see he will not carry out, as well as intentions t.hat it would be 
instrnment.ally irrational for hilIi to cany ouL IIere is an exalllple of 
lllyOpic planning: I form the intention to finish writ.ing a paper 
tomorrow, when .lust a linle fut.Llrc-orienl.ed re£leclioll \'vould reveal that I 
\'vill nol. finish writing my paper but will instead do a series of chores t.hat 
desperat.ely necd to gct done. _FuHhennore, iL is 110t that I am harboring 
the blse belief that I will have time for plenty of chores and plenty of 
writing- tomorrow-if I wcre, I would he not so llluch myopic as 
rnistaken. Rather. I have formed my intention without clearly focusing 
on (what things will be like for mc) t.OIIlOlTOW.~ 
IV. Intentions 
My ail11 is to show that instrumental rationality does not preclude myopic 
planning. But there is a worry that nceds 1.0 bc addressed Erst. TIle 
worry, \'vhich is suggested by t\vo in±1uential views concerning intent.ion, 
is that the idea of myopic planning is incoherenl. The two inlluential 
vie\vs I have in Inind are the 1011owing: 
(I) IIaving the intention to X implies having the helief that one 
will (probably) X.' 
2 Note that tb('fc- is ::I diffITc-ncc- hcn....·('en 'cliscollnljng future utility' aud myopic planning. 
Discountmg fLlture utility involvc-s giving less weight to oue's future (or distalll) good than 
to one's currc-nt (or nC::IT) good. 'Vhether discolluting future utility lits with being 
instnmwnt::llly r::ltional is a (pJestion thdt I will not consider here. 
3 For an influential ::In::llysis of intention incorporating this view. see (Awli 1973). 
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(2) Having the intent.ion to X illlplies judging' lhal. it would be 
desirable lor one to X.4 
If (1) is correct, then having' the intention t.o X seems to go hand in hand 
with judging t.hat., 'when the time lor aClion arrivcs, onc's situation and 
motivations combined will be conducive to one's X-ing. If (2) is COITCCl, 
then having the intention to X seems lo go hand in hand "vith judging 
that, when the timc for action arrives, one's siluation and motivations 
cOI11bined williavor one's X-ing. So if either (1) or (2) is tlue, the idea of 
myopic planning is arguably incoherent. 
There are, however, compelling counterexal11ples to both (1) and (2). 
Let. us start wit.h (1). To borrow two examples from rVlichael Bratn1an, 'I 
rmight] intend lo carry out a rescue operation,' while having serious 
doubts about whether I 'will succeed, because t.he operation 'requires a 
series of dilliculL steps'; or 'I might. intend now to stop at the books Lore 
on the way home,' while recognizing- that, given 'my tendency toward 
absentlIlindedness,' 1 may 'well forget to 111ake the SLOp (Bratman 19~7, 
37 -H). These exal11ples suggest the p()ssibility of 'intention-belief 
incompleteness,' whercin one intends to X but is agnostic aboul whether 
or not one will actually X (and somcl.imes cven about whether one will 
try to X or hc capable of X-ing given the lacts aboul oneself and onc's 
situation). 
NOle thaL while 1 would deny that having the intention Lo X implies 
having the belief that one will (probably) X, I am willing to ?;fant thal 
one cannol form thc intention to X if one is sw'e that one will not X. 1 
'will reter to this constraint on inLention as the negative belir:f con.sITain.t. For 
all I say in this papcr, it may even be tlue thal onc cannoL form the 
intention to X if one believes Lhal. one ""rill fJrobably' not X. (I hasten 1.0 
add, however, t.hat T find this view l11uch less compelling than the 
negative beliel" conslraint.):' 
\,ViLh respect to (2), consider the l()llowing odd scenario, "\",hich is 
4 FOT::m influcntial analy.sis of inLenLioll im.:orporating t.hi~ vi('w, s('(' ([)avid~on 1980). 
!) Fot (,nhglucning di.scussion collcemiug Lhese views, SC'(, (\kk 1989). 
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closely related to a scenario described by Hmvard Sobel in 'Useful 
int.cnl.loTls,.(j You ask me to LOlLeh my nosc. I ask 'why?' You say, 'no 
reason'. I don't bOlher c01nplying ~vith your request. You then tell me 
that if I tonn the intention to touch my nose as soon as YOll raise YOlLr 
hand, YOIl will give lllC $10. You explain thal I need noL actually touch 
HI)' nose to get the money. I Silllply need to form the intention t.o touch 
my nose "rhen you raise your han(i. As soon as lIly intention is formed, 
your intention-delecting Inachine 1""ill beep and I ""rill get 11ly money, 
reg-ardless of ,vhe-ther or not I actnally t.ouch my nose when you rai~e 
your hand. 1 bricfly cOI1'1ider your slrange oller, I lorm the intenlion to 
touch my nose when you raise your hand, your intcntion-detecting 
machinc bccps, and you hand over $10. Thoug'h lhis is a very strange 
scenario, it does not seem in1possible. If it is possible, we have a 
counlcrexample 1.0 (2), since, in the example, I am able to lorn1 the 
intention to touch my nose ,,,,,hen your raise your hand, even though I do 
not judge that il would be desirable for me to touch Illy nose ~vhen you 
raise your hand, :My intention is prompted by the prospect of being 
re\\-Tarclcd for forming the intention (and perhaps by a dcsirc to see your 
intention-detecting machine in action), not by any desirable feature of 
the intcnded acl.. 
If (1) or (2) were tme, the idea of myopic planning would, it seems, 
be incoherent. But. thc cases I have dcscribed suggest'lhaL (I) and (2) are 
lalse. Obviously my appeal to these cases does not. constitnte a 
t.hor011ghly (kvelopcd defense ()f the idea of 11IYOpic planning against (1) 
and (2), No such delense will be provided here, For the purposes of this 
paper, 1 will henceforth aSSlllue Lhat thc idea or myopic planning is 
cohercnt, and that myopic planning is, thus, possible. Taking this for 
granted, the question I will focus on answering is 'whether myopic 
planning is possible for the instrumenlalty ration.at agent. 
6 SC'(, (Sobd I 994). 
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v. Myopic Planning and the Toxin Puzzle 
Let A ht:' an illstnlnlenwlly rational agent (who i~ not nllder the inlluence 
of hypnDsis or the likt,). alld keep in mind thaL if A\ X-ing 'would be 
irrational. then A will not X. According to the view thaL instrumental 
raLioIlaliLy precludes myopic planning, if A is nOl prcs~cd for time and if 
just a little futurc-oricntcd reflcction would convince A that. she will not 
X, then A ,,,,'ill not-indeed, cannol-form the intention to X. To gel a 
sense of this view's influence on debales concerning instnlmental 
rationality, it is lL:-.eful to look, for cxample, at the debale :-,uITouncling 
Gregory Kavka's famous toxin puzzle.! (Like the last, strange case I 
described in the previous section, K.''1vka's case is an autmunu()'u."i benefit 
rase. Tn autonomous benefit cases, there is an act.ion X such that fonning 
the intention tD X bcncfits the agent regardless of \·vherher the agent 
actually X-,.) 
In Kavka's im'Cllt.cc1 casc_ 
an eccentric: hillinrlain: .,' pbcl;'s before you a vial or tuxin.. [You arc 
provided with the following information:] If yOU drink rUle loxinJ, litJ will 
make you painf'IU)' ill for a day, IJUl will not threaten yOIl!' life or havc any 
lasting effects... The hillionaire will pay YOll one million dollars t.omo[ row 
morning iC ::It midnighL L<JIlight, you int.end t.o drink the toxin tomorrow 
afternoon .... YOll need not drink (he toxin to receive the rnoney; in fact, Lhe 
money will already be in your bank <lccounL hour's before the time for 
drinking- it arrives, if }'Ol1 sllcceed .... fThcl arrangemenr or '" eXLernal 
incenLives is ruled out, as arc such alternaLive gimmick~ as hiring a hypnotist 
to implant the intention .... (Kavka 1983,33-4) 
The puzzle, in part, raises the question of ,,,,'hether an instrulIlcntally 
rational agent. omld, in the strange situation Kavka describes, form the 
intention to drink Lht' loxin. There are two main lines of n:"'pollse to t.he 
puzzle. Somt:' argue that drinking the t.oxin is irrational and conclude 
that instll1111ental raiiOlla1ity is an obstacle to Janning Lhe intentiDn to 
drillk tht:' toxin.h Others argue that drinking the toxin is rational and 
conclude tha[ instnITTlcTltal rationality is noL an ou..,Lade to forming- the 
7 See (K:wb [9X;11. 
R Sc.C', for example, tEl'atnhul lIJ99). 
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intention to drink the toxin. 9 vvbile the idea th<it drinking the toxin is 
irrational fits willl tIlt' lraditi(Hlal aSSlllIlptiOlI Ihal inslnll]]('ntal 
Iationality calls J()!" straightli)rward maximization, lhe idea that drinkillg 
the toxin is rational rests on the contention (hat instrumental ratioltaHty 
calls fol' cOTlstrained maximization (and, IllOre specifically, for ~ticking to 
intentions thac one did well to form and that one \v'ould not have been 
able to form without the rcsoluteness characteristic of a cOTlstrained 
maximizer). BoLh lines of response fit neatly wilh Lhe idea that if 
instrumental rationality prohibits drinking the toxin, then (barring 
hypnosis and t.he like) the illstnlmeIllally rational agellt will noL drink 
the toxin, ·willloresee this, and so (given the negative belief constraint on 
intent.ion) willllot bc able Lo form the intention to (lrlnk t1w toxin. 
Conspicuously missing is any discussion of the possibility that even if 
in~trunH_'ntal ratiolla1ity prohibits (lrinking the LOxill, lh(' illstrLllIlellLally 
rational agent Inay be able to m~'Yopicall-y 10rm the intention to drink the 
toxin .. I his is an iltten'stillg and significant oIIlissioll "inn:, as will SOOIl 
become apparent, autonomDUS benefit cases, like the toxin puzzle, can 
actually he lIsed to SIlPI'OTI the possibility of instnlmcntally ratiollal 
myopic planning. And it instrumental rationalily does not preclude 
myopic planning, then t.here is room for the following neglectecl 
cOlubinatioLl: (i) drinking the toxin is irrational, but (ii) instrumenLal 
rationality is not an ohstade tQ forming the intention to drink the t.oxin. 
VI. The Belief-Economizing Agent 
I turn now to a descriplion of the bel£e/-econornizing agent, \,,,ho willligure 
in my delense Df the possibility of instrumentally rational luyopic 
planning. As t.he label suggest.s, the bclief-econowiLing agent will he 
thriny when it COllIes to lorming beliefs. :\-fore speci1ically, she will make 
prediction;; ahc..mt her future choices and actions when ,HIll only whell 
prediction" concerning these fULure choices and actions are required by 
9 SC'c., for (''{ample, iGauthic.l" \994). 
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instrumental ra!iol1aliJ),. and "he will refnlin from Inaking ungroundf'd 
or inadequately grounded assLlmptions about her future choices an(l 
actions. She will thus be thrifty \vithout being stingy to the point ofhciug 
criticizahly short-sighted, Suppose, for cxample. that she ios interested in 
inve'lting some Inoney in bond hwd B. Suppose Ltlrther that she will f;lce 
a ~liff penalty if she reIr1(lves her money , .... 1thin six l11Onths. Then, other 
things equal (and aS~\llning. in pal"ticulal, tha.t she doe" nOI want to fan' 
a stiff penalty), she \vi11. before deciding whether to invest her IJ1()]wy. 
predict. whether, if sht:" illvesLs her lIIoney no"\', she is likely (to have 
reason) to remove it ,,,rithin six months, If, ho'¥vever, t.hillgs were different 
and she could convcnient.ly remove her money ,vhenever she ",ranted and 
\vithout penalty, then, other things equal, she \\'ould BOt. expend the 
meTlt.al resources neces:-.ary to predict whether, if she invests her money 
now, she i'l likely (to have reason) to remove i( willull six. month:..: nOi 
\-\'ould she simply aCl"cpl. an ungrounded or inadequately grounded 
assuillption concerning ' .... ·heLher, if she inv(::-.t~ her money now, she 1>;, 
likely (10 have rcason) t.o remove it. \vithin six months. 
Notice that the belief-economizing agenl. can reason ,,,Tell in pursuing 
her goals, l.aking into account what needs to be taken into accolUlt as ~he 
proceeds, without thinking in l.eflns of Lhe concept of inst.nlfnental 
lat.iollality. Relatedly, the belief-economizing agent can take into aCCOBIll 
v.-hat needs to be taken inLO account. as :-.hc prou'Cds, without thinking 
aLoul. what. she is doing 1n these terms. Her attention can be directed l)y 
her goals without her having thought.s like '\Vhat does 1nstrumenta1 
ralionality re(plire of me now?' or '\,Vllat do Illy goals call for now?' Hcr 
thoughts can locus directly on her opt.ions awl their consequences. They 
cm 1)(-' (houghts like 'If J im'est this Inoner now, and then reUlOve 1t iu 
three mouths, I w ill face a sl itI penalt.y.' 
VII. The Belief-Economizing Agent and the Toxin Puzzle 
\Vhy does the possibility of the be1ief-econorniL.ing agent threaten the 
view thaI instl"ll1nental rat.ionality precludes myopic planning? \Vell, as 
we have already seen, there are cases-likc Klvka's toxin else-in which 
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fnrTning the intention to perfurm a certain action, say to X, will grcatJy 
beneEt an agent even though actually X-ing wil1 connict with the ag·ent's 
concerns. III al least. some such cases, the belief-economizing agent wilJ 
be able to engage in myopic planning. Takc Kavka's toxin case. 
Prompted hy t.hc cousideration that. fOrIlling the intention to drink lhe 
toxin will get her a million (lollars, and without expending the menLal 
re~ources nece'lsary {o plcdicl \"he.ther or no!. she will l()r is likely to) 
actually drink lhe toxin (or have reason Lo drin k the toxin) \-vhen the 
lilllc for action arrives, t.bc bclief-econOlllizing agcnt will, in the situation 
Kavka describcs, form the intention to drink the toxin. Hccal.lsc she 
bencfit.s hom lorming l.he int.ent.ion to drink t.he l.oxin whether or nol 
her intention will ultilllately lead her to drink the toxin, instnuIlcntal 
ratiunalily does not require her to predict, beLC .. re forlTling her intention, 
whether ",h(' will (or is likely to) carry out her intention (or have reason 
to carry ouL her intention) when the tillle Lor act10n arrives, Her brand of 
thrinjness-which is noL a lorm of criticizable stinginess-·will thus 
prcvcut her li'Olll lllaking any sllch prediction (including an ungrounded 
or inadequately grounded prediction), I he belief-economizing agcnl. will 
thus be aLle to lorm the intention to drink the toxin even if just a little 
LCKused reflection on what things will bc like Cor her when t.hc l.iuK' for 
action <lnive'} would convince hcr Lhat she will not drink the toxin. As 
sllch, though she i~ not criticizable f~·pl1l lhe point of vic,<\.' of 
instrumental rationality, the helief-economizing agelll. can engage III 
nlyopic planning. 
Note l.hat. if the Lol1owing 1.\'\'0 sets of bets coincided, then fill' view 
that the belief-economizing agent can engage in myopic planning in the 
toxin case would be threatened: t.he facts that reveal lonlling tile 
illtelltion to drink thc l.OXiIl a:-. beneficial reganlkss of wh(:tlier olle's 
intention ull.ilnal.ciy leads one- to drink the Lo ...... 1n; the filcts necessary llw a 
prediction about one's drillking the toxin. For if thcse Lwo sets of farb 
coincided, then attcnding to the former would amount to al.l.endillg to 
l.he latter. But the t"ll\"O sets of fact.s do not coincide .. I'o sec that this is so, 
note lirst that the following set of facts reveals Conning the intcnl.ion to 
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drink lilt' toxin as beneficial reganlles~ of whether one's inLelltlon 
ulrimately leads one to drink I he toxin: one \'\T111 get a million dollan) jf 
one forms the intention to drink the toxiu.; the negativL' effects of 
drinking' the toxin are relatively minoT, and so, whether or not one's 
intention persists and leads OtiC to drink the toxin, one benefits trom 
fonning it. This set of facts, how eyer, does not suffice for a prediction 
concerning OTIC'S drinking the toxin. Additional features of the situation 
and of oneself need to be atlended to and synthesized for :>Il1ch a 
prediction. And, as I have already sugge~ted, the belief-economizing 
agent ,'\.'ill not engage in further rdlection aimed at Inaking such a 
prt:dinion_ 
There are h\'o further points th(lt it is v!:'ry ilnponaI1t to ket'p ill 
mimI: First, my inl(TeS[ is in ckfLuding the conclusion thaL the helief-
economizing agent can (in certain cases) engage in myopic planning, not 
in finding- a solulion lo all the worries and questioTls raised by Kavka's 
toxin puzzle. In particular, my argUlllent lhat the helicf-economizing 
agent. can engage in rnyopic planning in the toxin case is not heing put 
f01ward a~ a solution to the toxin puzzle. \IVhether there is enough here 
f()f the construction of an acceptal)le and complete solution lo Kavka's 
puzzle is a question that 1 will not ronsidt'L 
Second, reral1 that, as I am conceiving of instrumental rationality, the 
jnstrumental1y rational agellt need not he highly self-reflective. So long 
as an agent reasons well in purslliug her goals, taking into aCCOllnr \'dlat 
needs to he taken into account as ~he proceeds, then the agent is 
instnllTlentally rational, even if she procced~ without mIlch self-
reHection. It may be that for certain highly sdf-rellective agents, myopic 
planning is not possible. Consider, for exalnple, (In agent "vho conceives 
of herself (IS instnunentally rational, has a theory-indeed lht: correct 
theory-or insLnlmental rationality, and invariably has both the 
rOIH:ept.ion of herself as rational alld her theory of f<ltionaliLy fit the 
forefront of her mind when forming illlclltions awl acting. Suppose 
further th(lt the correct theo1'\' of instlul11cntal rationality calls for 
straighLionl.'ard maximization. Then it i:-, arguable that the ageTlt. in 
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question could not lllyopical1y lorm the intenlloTl to drink the toxin. For, 
g·jvell that she knows thal she is illsLrumelltally rational, and given that it 
is Lransparclll relative to her theory of inslrlllllt'lltal rationality-which is 
at the forefront of her milld-that drinking the toxill ~"'ould not be 
insLnUllentally ratioTh'lI, she will be Sllre that she \vill not drink the toxin. 
But the inslrumentally rmional agent needllol resemble the agent just 
described. So there is l"OOlll for instrumental rationality and myopic 
planning 1.0 coexist. 
Note that whell all agent i~ facing a situation in 'real life' , rarher than 
enCOUlll.ering a (perhaps structufall~: similar) situation in a work of 
philosophy, the agellt's refledivenesr; is likely to be relatively low-Iev!:,l 
aJld practlc<lIly if..Kl.lsed. Encowltt:ring a situation in a ,",wrk of philo~ophv 
invites highly reflect.ive, theoretical enga~eIIlCI1t alld brings (via 
description, ',,"'hich is by its Vel'\, nature ~elective) variolls theoretit.ally 
interestillg' features of the situation into sharp foclls-including, 
oftentimes, features thal, from the point of view of instrument.al 
rationalily, need not be attended to. 
VIII. Where Do We Fit In? 
.rvTy arglllnent. in a nutshell, is as follows: 
'11lere is a ~ort or belief-ecoluHuiLing agent tll~t is both inStlUlllclltally 
raLional alld capahle of myopic planning. 
Therefore, inslrumental rationality does not preclude I1lYOPlC 
planning. 
But are human beings anything' like the helief-economizing agent I have 
described? I dOLlht that we are relentlessly economical "vhcn it comes t.o 
belief f()nnation. Still, we seem to he ilt I('ast somewhat econOlnical. IIere 
aft: two familiar examples ofbelief-economizalion: 
F.xa-mtll.c 1: A couple of night ... a week. I form the intention to wa1.ch 
only one televi~ion program before g'oing to !Jed. \'\/hell I don't have to 
get lip early the nexl morning, T typically 101m my intelltion \"ithout 
ex])t:'lldin<r the mental resources neCt:':-i:-,aI\, 1.0 I)redict whether I will, if I 
~ . 
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plop myself down on ttw couch, aClually wa1.ch a single pro,6'Tiim and 
then go lO hed. (From the POilU of vie,,,,' of instrulllcnlal rationality, this 
bit of economization seems to nlake sense;. For, assUlning thaL it is no big 
deal if inertia leads nle lo stay up a bit laLe, and that I mll bett.er off 
staying up a bit. late than 110t watching any television at all, instrumental 
rat.ionality does noL reqllire me to predict. whct.hcr I will, if I plop myself 
down on the couch, actually watch a single program and then go to bed.) 
F'xample 2: 'Vhilc anxiollsly waiting for a hus' that I realized I might 
have already lnissed, I swore to myself that I \vCHJld henceforth give 
myself lllore buffer time be1(Jre important appointments_ I did this 
without expending the mental resources necessary to predict whether I 
would stick to my resolution_ (Again, from the point of view of 
instrumental rationality, this bit of econOlIlization seenIS to make sense_ 
For, assluning that it doesn't hurt to make the resolution (whether I stick 
to it or not), instIulnental rationality docs not. require nle to predict, 
belore making the resolution, whct.her I "\vill actually stick to it if I Inake 
it. ) 
IX. Cone lusion 
'Ve are le1t: with t\vo conclusions: (1) A.s is delnonstrated hy the possibiliLy 
of the helief-econolniziIlg agent. an agent can he instrumentally rational 
and yet sti11 engage in myopic planning. (2) Though 'we human beings 
lIlay not he as relentlessly economical a..'1 the idealized belief-economizing 
agent that I described in section VI. belief economization is a lzuniliar 
phenomenon, and so inst.rumentall)1 rational myopic planning is a real 
possibility for us. 
"I 'his possibility has been disregarded, even by philosophers fmniliar 
with autonOlnous benefit cas(;s. like the toxin case, which actually 
support the po~sihility of instrumentally rational Inyopic planIling. This 
disregard has skBved dehat.es sUlTounding autonomous benefit. cases, 
including debat.es concerning how instnllnental rationality is best 
modeled given autonomOllS benefit ca~e~. Missing is the recognition 
tTh'lt. even when time is not an isslle, thinking- one's plans through is not 
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always the thing to do. 
Life "\'v'oldd be ilupos~ihly overv..rhelming ifv.'e didn't largely attend to 
things on a need-to-knmv basis. In SOlIle cases Inyopic planning is the 
Tesult. FrOln the point of ViBV 01" instrumental rationality, this is shnply 
not a problem. Indeed, it's ideal. :\) 
UnitJersiLy oI l/tah 
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